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SEPTEMBER 11, 2001:
THE CONSTITUTION DURING CRISIS:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE
Lori Sachs*
INTRODUCTION
At 8:48 a.m. on September 11, 2001, the first of two hijacked
planes crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center in
New York City. By 10:28 a.m., the worst attack on American soil
had ended, but the nation had not yet begun to react.1 Four flights
had been hijacked that day: two crashed into the World Trade
Center, one into the Pentagon, and one into a field in rural
Pennsylvania.2
Almost immediately, officials placed the blame on Osama bin
Laden3 and the al-Qaeda network.4 This was not the first time that
* J.D. Candidate, 2003 at Fordham University School of Law, B.S., Cornell Uni-
versity, 2000. I would like to thank Professor Fleming for his invaluable knowledge of
constitutional theory as well as Gail Glidewell and Peter Acton for their insight and
guidance. And of course I thank my family and friends without whose encourage-
ment and support I would have never been able to come this far.
2. See Nancy Gibbs, If You Want To Humble an Empire, TIME, Sept. 14, 2001, at
32 (providing a detailed description of the events of September 11, 2001).
Desks and chairs and people were sucked out the windows and rained down
on the streets below. Men and women, cops and fire fighters watched and
wept. As fire and debris fell, cars blew up; the air smelled of smoke and
concrete, that smell that spits out of jackhammers chewing up pavement.
You could taste the air more easily than you could breathe it.
Id.
3. See Serge Schemann, U.S. Attacked; President Vows To Exact Punishment for
'Evil', N.Y. TIMES,, Sept. 12, 2002, at Al. American Flight 11, a Boeing 767 en route
from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center.
Id. United Airlines Flight 175, en route from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the
south tower. Flight 77, a Boeing 757 flying from Washington's Dulles International
Airport to Los Angeles, flew into the Pentagon. Id. United Airlines Flight 93, en
route from Newark, New Jersey, to San Francisco, California, crashed in Somerset
County, Pennsylvania. Id. 266 people were confirmed dead on the planes. Id. 184
were confirmed dead at the Pentagon. A Nation Challenged; Dead and Missing, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at A17. Approximately 3014 were confirmed dead or missing in
the World Trade Center. Id.
4. On September 13, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced Bin Laden as
the prime suspect in the attacks. See Bill Glauber, Blair Outlines Evidence In At-
tacks; House of Commons Is Told Bin Laden, Al-Qaida Struck U.S., BALT. SUN, Oct.
5, 2001, at Al. British Prime Minister Tony Blair publicly accused bin Laden of mak-
ing the attack: "The attacks on 11 September bear all the hallmarks of a bin Laden
operation: meticulous long-term planning; a desire to inflict mass casualties; a total
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bin Laden and his associates had demonstrated their hatred for the
United States.5 But this attack differed from previous terrorist in-
cidents. Before September 11, 2001, Americans cared little about
terrorism.6 Yet because the attack was on American soil, many
Americans feared further terrorist attacks by people living within
U.S. borders.7
In a speech delivered on September 20, 2001, President George
W. Bush suggested that, despite the crisis, all efforts would be
made to safeguard constitutional liberties: "We're in a fight for our
principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one
should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because
of their ethnic background or religious faith."8
President Bush's remarks, however, do not represent the senti-
ment pervading the country since the attacks on September 11,
2001.9 His remarks have not calmed the fears of thousands of peo-
ple living in the United States who are concerned that their rights
will be infringed upon by legislation purporting to eliminate terror-
ism.10 This Comment addresses how the United States should re-
disregard for innocent lives, including Muslims; multiple simultaneous attacks; and
the use of suicide attackers." Id. Further, intelligence reports indicate that bin Laden
"told associates that he had a major operation against America under operation." Id.
5. Osama bin Laden and other Islamic fundamentalists have been extensively
involved in numerous terrorist attacks involving Americans over the past decade.
PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY Xiii (1998).
6. Id. Islamic Fundamentalists believe that radical action is necessary to bring
society in line with the Qur'n, the biblical text of the Muslim tradition. Id. at xiii-xiv.
7. The FBI reports that from 1985 to 1995, there were only two international
terrorist incidents on U.S. soil: the bombing of the World Trade Center in February
1993 and the occupation of the Iranian Mission to the United Nations in 1992. HEY-
MANN, supra note 4, at 1.
8. See, e.g., John Ashcroft, A Clear and Present Danger, RESPONSIVE COMMU-
NITY, Winter 2001-02, at 16. There have been numerous threats made of future at-
tacks since September 11, 2001. Id.
9. President George W. Bush, Presidential Response Concerning the Events of
September 11, 2001, 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. D35. This was President Bush's first address
from the White House since the attacks on September 11, 2001.
10. Incidents of racism have swept the nation since September 11, 2001, especially
against Arab Americans. E.g., Teresa Mask, Arab-American Lawyers Ask for Protec-
tion, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Sept. 27, 2001, at 14 (noting death threats received at
mosques and other hate crimes directed toward people who appear to be of Middle
Eastern descent); Cecilia M. Vega, Reprisals Worry Arab-Americans, Muslims, Re-
member Racial Attacks That Followed Oklahoma City Bombing, PRESS DEMOCRAT,
Sept. 12, 2001, at B3 (reporting that approximately 1.2 million people of Arab descent
living in the United States are at a high risk of hate crimes. Immediately following the
Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, Muslims reported more than 200 incidents of har-
assment; similar incidents are expected to occur following the attacks of September
11, 2001).
CONSTITUTION DURING CRISIS
spond to the threat of domestic terrorism while continuing to
safeguard civil liberties.
Part I of this Comment describes three classic theories of democ-
racy. Constitutional democracy entails an active role for the judici-
ary as part of a counter-majoritarian effort. Representative
democracy, in contrast, protects the will of the majority and focuses
on judicial restraint. Deliberative democracy focuses more on ac-
tive participation by the citizenry to uphold the values of the Con-
stitution. Part II examines how representative and constitutional
democracy have been applied in another episode in our nation's
history-the Japanese internment during World War II. Part III
compares the crisis following the September 11 attacks to the Japa-
nese internment and examines how the different branches of gov-
ernment should protect civil liberties. Part IV suggests that a
theory of deliberative democracy should be applied to best balance
the competing interests of national security and civil liberties.
I. THREE THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY
In times of national crisis, the government must respond effec-
tively, while at the same time preserving constitutional liberties.11
The Supreme Court has traditionally deferred extensively to Con-
gress in times of crisis.12 In so doing, many laws and rights have
been silenced. 3 Yet hindsight has often left the Court regretting
its past decisions.14 The questions of how to interpret the Constitu-
11. See David Cole, Fighting Terrorism - Not the Constitution, RESPONSIVE COM-
MUNITY, Winter 2001-02, at 48, 52.
12. For a complete discussion of liberties during times of war, see MICHAEL
LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR (1990).
The book evaluates the government's response to wars and other international inci-
dents throughout American history. Id.
13. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the
war-making branches of government are best situated to determine how to wage war
successfully). For a complete discussion of the merits of this case, see infra Part II.
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN WARTIME (1998) (tracing attempts by the United States to balance the preserva-
tion of civil liberties with the need for national security from the Civil War through
the post-World War II era). For example, during the Civil War, President Lincoln
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, despite Justice Taney's determination that such
suspension was unconstitutional. Id. at 39. In an address to Congress, Lincoln asked,
"Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to
pieces, lest that one be violated?" President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress
(July 4, 1861), reprinted in WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING & SOTIRIOs A.
BARBER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1373, 1375 (2d ed. 1995).
For a complete discussion of the suspension of law during wartime, see REHNQUIST,
supra, at 218-25 and WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING & SOTIRIOS A. BAR-
BER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1365 (2d ed. 1995).
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tion and who has the responsibility to do so are at the core of the
tension between deferring to lawmakers and preserving civil
liberties.
How the Constitution is interpreted determines how our nation
responds to crisis. Some theorists contend that the Court should
affirmatively safeguard constitutional rights. This theory is com-
monly called constitutional democracy. Others espouse a repre-
sentative democracy, which entails deference to the majority and
the political process. This is commonly called representative de-
mocracy. Finally, some believe that our system of government was
set up to require an active citizenry-a deliberative democracy.
Though all three theories agree that citizens have rights against the
government,15 each differs on how those rights should be
protected.
A. Constitutional Democracy
Constitutional democracy embraces the idea that the judiciary is
primarily responsible for interpreting the Constitution, even
though it shares this task with the president and Congress. 6 While
it may not be the province of the Court to save the country from
ruin, constitutional democrats believe the Court should take an ac-
tive role especially during times of crisis.7
Constitutional theorist Ronald Dworkin envisions the Constitu-
tion as a protector of individual rights and rejects a simple
majoritarian theory of government.1 8 Reliance on the political pro-
cess would yield a "majority rules" approach to civil liberties, and
minority groups might suffer as a result.1 9
15. See, e.g., infra note 37.
16. See, e.g., PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 9, 11
(1949) (noting that, with respect to human rights, there is "a remarkable core of
agreement on the Court."); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
137-38 (1977) (rejecting the simple majoritarian theory of government and relying
instead on the judiciary to safeguard our rights).
It is important to note, however, that theorists differ as to the substance of these
rights. Compare JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 101 (1980) (embracing a process-oriented approach to the Constitution
in which the due process rights of individuals are more significant than the substantive
rights granted by the Constitution), with Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence
of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (suggesting that
the rights embodied in the Constitution are more substantive than procedural).
17. See, e.g., Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop A Jurispru-
dence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, Law School of Hebrew Univer-
sity, Jerusalem, Israel, Dec. 22, 1987.
18. See id.
19. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 133.
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Dworkin opines that the political process alone cannot safeguard
our constitutional rights.2 ° Members of the judiciary are not
elected officials and have an obligation to the Constitution, not to
the public.2 1 Dworkin's theory of judicial activism assumes that cit-
izens have certain moral rights against the government and that
these rights are best protected by the judiciary.22
Another proponent of constitutional democracy, Justice William
Brennan, Jr., advocates that it is the Court's role to resolve public
controversies to safeguard constitutional freedoms. 23 Brennan re-
jects the idea that controversial issues should be left to the political
process to resolve. 24 He argues that, despite its apparent appeal,
resolving controversial issues through the political process is not
suitable for a democracy. "It is the very purpose of a Constitu-
tion- and particularly the Bill of Rights-to declare certain values
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majori-
ties."' 25 This prevents judges from injecting their own views into
their opinions. 26 Instead of a set of rules, Brennan sees the Consti-
tution as a composition of abstract principles, to be interpreted by
every generation. 27 "We current justices read the Constitution in
the only way we can: as Twentieth-Century Americans. '28  The
greatest strength of democracy and of the Constitution, Brennan
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 255. Dworkin concludes that though a democrat may, at first glance,
espouse a government in which elected officials decide "debatable issues of moral and
political theory," citizens will only be able to enforce their moral rights against the
state through an institution that does not have to answer to a constituency. Id. at 255-
57.
23. Id.
24. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L.J. 433 (1986). Brennan assumes that there are certain values
that are beyond the scope of any legislature. Id. at 437. Rejecting a majoritarian
theory of government, Brennan embraces the idea that judges must resolve contro-
versies that result from competing factions. Id. However, constitutional democrats
do not rely solely on judges to safeguard civil liberties. E.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Con-
fusing Freedom with License, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 2001-02, at 56; Lau-
rence H. Tribe, We Can Strike a Balance on Civil Liberties, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Winter 2001-02, at 28, 30 (emphasizing that we should not rely solely on the courts to
safeguard our freedoms; the legislative branch must do their part as well).
25. Brennan, supra note 23, at 437. "Blind faith in democracy is one thing, blind
faith quite another." Id.
26. Id. Brennan calls for an "interaction of reader and text" to resolve ambigui-
ties and move forward both morally and politically. Id. at 433.
27. Id. at 434. "Justices are not Platonic guardians appointed to wield authority
according to their personal moral predilections." Id.
28. Id. at 438.
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insists, is the ability of justices to adapt the principles embodied in
the text to current situations.29
According to Brennan, justices cannot "avoid a definitive inter-
pretation"3 of controversial statutes or situations; they are respon-
sible for advancing and protecting our rights and interests.31
Brennan warns that as the government increasingly encroaches
upon citizens' private lives, it becomes ever more necessary for the
judiciary to actively protect individual rights.32
Constitutional democracy calls upon judges to use the Constitu-
tion to limit what the majority can do.33 The Court safeguards the
principles embodied in the Constitution for all citizens, not just the
majority of them.34
Constitutional democracy urges that individual rights be pro-
tected even in emergencies.35 In a speech delivered in 1987, Justice
Brennan, emphasized that civil liberties should not be sacrificed
during times of national crisis.36 Brennan cited several historical
examples of the Court's validation of legislative attempts to sacri-
fice civil liberties in response to a crisis.37 Brennan emphasized the
importance of judicial activism during such times: "A jurisprudence
that is capable of sustaining the supremacy of civil liberties over
exaggerated claims of national security only in times of peace is, of
course, useless at the moment that civil liberties are most in
danger." 38
29. Id.
30. Id. "For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great princi-
ples to cope with current problems and current needs." Id. Brennan suggests that in
a constitutional democracy, judges provide the building blocks for future generations
to protect against the majority. Id. at 437.
31. Id.
32. Id. But see, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 23; Tribe, supra note 23 (emphasizing that
we should not rely solely on the courts to safeguard our freedoms; the legislative
branch must do their part as well).
33. Brennan, supra note 23, at 440.
34. E.g., DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 249; Brennan, supra note 23, at 434-35.
35. Brennan, supra note 16.
36. Id.
37. Id. ("The sudden national fervor causes people to exaggerate the security risks
posed by allowing individuals to exercise their civil liberties and to become willing
'temporarily' to sacrifice liberties as part of the war effort.").
38. Brennan cites to the following historical examples of overreaching legislation:
In 1798, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts which punished people who
were judged dangerous or who wrote against the United States Government. During
the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, leading to the
groundless arrests of 20,000-30,000 people. During World War I, Congress enacted
the Espionage Act which criminalized the making of false statements with the intent
of interfering with the success of the military. Finally, Japanese and Japanese Ameri-
1720
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According to Brennan, the only way to protect citizens' rights is
to rely on the fundamental aspirations embodied in the Constitu-
tion, and not on the impulses of representatives. 39 The time may
come, Brennan warned, when elected officials will use their power
in ways that are contrary to our notions of democracy.40 The judi-
ciary should intervene in these situations to ensure that the goals of
the Constitution are enforced.
Hindsight has caused the nation to regret the times it sacrificed
civil liberties for national security.41 It has not yet, however, estab-
lished a way to deal with similar future problems. 42 Brennan criti-
cizes the judiciary for not taking responsibility when a situation
calls for review.43 There is no question that total deference to
elected officials has been detrimental to the civil liberties of
citizens.44
B. Representative Democracy
In contrast to constitutional democracy, representative democ-
racy, urges the judiciary to defer to the representative process. 45
Proponents of the theory contend that the legislature and executive
have the primary authority to interpret the Constitution. They pre-
sume that legislative actions are constitutional so long as they are
rational.46
cans were interned following the attack on Pearl Harbor and thousands of innocent
people were forced from their homes. Id. For a detailed discussion of the Japanese
Internment, see infra Part II.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Part of the problem may be the United States' infrequent interaction with
crisis. "[B]ecause the United States has had the good fortune of relative tranquility,
the incidents have been episodic, and the lessons learned and the experience garnered
have grown faint during the lapses between security crises." Id.
44. Id. "We must meet the challenge rather than wish it were not before us." Id.
Brennan warns, as did Santayana, that "[T]hose who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it." Id.
45. Id. "The trouble in the United States, however, has been not so much the
refusal to recognize principles of civil liberties during times of war and national crisis
but rather the reluctance and inability to question, during the period of panic, as-
serted wartime dangers with which the nation and the judiciary is unfamiliar." Id.
46. E.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129
(1893) (maintaining that the citizenry's chief protection lies not in the courts, but
rather in our political process).
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James Bradley Thayer maintains that people are "wise, virtuous,
and competent to manage their own affairs. '4 7 As such, it is not
the duty of the courts to overrule what people do through elected
officials.48 The majority rules, and whatever the majority sees fit to
do should be the rule of the land.4 9
According to Thayer's doctrine of clear mistake,5° courts should
ask whether the act of the legislature or executive clearly conflicts
with the duties of these branches as granted by the Constitution.5
If the answer is negative, then the Court should simply affirm the
legislative action. 2 Even if it turns out that elected officials have
failed to perform their duties, the Court should still be deferential
because constituents will simply vote them out of office.53
Thayer acknowledges that the Court is the "ultimate arbiter of
what is rational and permissible. ' 54 But, it is first and foremost the
duty of the legislature to determine the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.5 5 The Constitution was written by the people and the legisla-
ture is elected by the people. 56 The legislature, and not the courts,
therefore, is the "lawgiver. 57
Thayer rejects the contention of constitutional democracy theo-
rists that the Court is the protector of rights.58 He argues that a
limited role of the judiciary is built into the structure of our democ-
racy. 59 Because the judiciary is given only "incidental and post-
47. See generally Thayer, supra note 45, at 135.
48. Id. at 149. Thayer justifies his theory on the fact that when the colonists won
the Revolutionary War, they took the power that had governed them from Great
Britain and transformed it into a system of self-governance. Id. at 131. "[T]hey were
precepts from the people themselves who were to be governed, addressed to each of
their own number, and especially to those who were charged with the duty of con-
ducting the government." Id.
49. Id. at 136.
50. Id. "The constitutions not merely intrust to the legislatures a preliminary de-
termination of the question, but they contemplate that this determination may be the
final one; for they secure no revision of it." Id.
51. Id. at 144.
52. Id. This test confines the jurisdiction of the Court to only issue a "rule of
administration." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also BICKEL, supra note 45.
55. Thayer, supra note 45, at 152.
56. Id. Thayer rests his theory on the structure of the government. If the judiciary
were to have a larger role in interpreting the Constitution, "they would have been let
in . .. to a revision of the laws before they began to operate." Id. at 136.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 152, referring to remarks made by an English bishop several centuries
ago: "Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is
he who is truly the lawgiver." Id.
59. Id. at 136.
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poned control"6 over acts of the legislature, it should not have the
authority to interpret the Constitution as broadly as the
legislature.61
Further, excessive judicial review will encourage the legislature
to act based on the constitutionality of laws rather than on their
collective wisdom.62 Consequently, people will remove themselves
from the political process as they see that courts, rather than the
legislature, shape and affect policy.63
Not surprisingly, the jurisprudence of the Court during times of
crisis under a representative democracy is different from that
which constitutional democracy theorists such as Brennan advo-
cate.64 In accordance with this theory, Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist emphasizes the necessity of our Constitution to adapt to
wartime.65 The emergencies in our nation's history have resulted
in Inter Armes Silent Leges-silence of the laws.66 Chief Justice
Rehnquist recounts incidents where the Court found it necessary to
protect the integrity of the country by curtailing the civil liberties
of a select few.67 Though he does not always agree with the out-
come of the cases,68 Rehnquist recognizes the need to balance con-
stitutional liberties with constitutional safeguards. 69 The Chief
Justice quotes Justice Learned Hand as saying that "a society in
which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a
society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few."7
Another theorist, Alexander Bickel, has suggested that the judi-
ciary remain silent when political questions arise.71 The judiciary
should reserve judgment on such issues rather than rule on what
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 156. Thayer is concerned that legislatures will shy away from enacting
laws if the Court always strikes them down. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cf. supra notes 36-44.
66. REHNQUIST, supra note 13, at 224.
67. Id.
68. Id. Throughout the book, Rehnquist cites examples in our nation's history,
including the Civil War, World War I, and World War II, in which citizens have been
deprived of their civil liberties. Id. at 3-169, 170-83, 194-217.
69. Id. at 203.
70. Id. at 218.
71. Id. at 222 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 191 (1952)).
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appear to be imminent cases.72 Only ineffective judgments 73 will
result if the judiciary acts too often or too quickly. 4
Though Bickel ultimately justifies judicial review on the ground
that the judiciary must enforce the will of the people,75 he argues
that judicial review is a "deviant institution. ' 76 Judicial review is
undemocratic because, when the Court declares an act unconstitu-
tional, it does so against the will of the prevailing majority.77 Rep-
resentative democracy rests on the theory that citizens can be
trusted to elect wise men to positions of power, in both the legisla-
tive and executive branches.78 Bickel argues that because these
two branches need each other to make the law, there is an inherent
check on the overwhelming power of the majority.79
According to Bickel, when the judiciary uses its power to inter-
pret the Constitution, it renders the legislative branch powerless. 80
This, in effect, nullifies the votes of the citizens.8 Bickel further
contends that judicial review creates distrust of elected officials. 8 2
Even if people do vote, they conclude that their voice may not mat-
ter in the end.83 Bickel is concerned that excessive judicial review
will damage the political process; rather than becoming active citi-
zens, people will rely on the Court's decisions as definitive.84
Bickel believes that how the country should respond to a timely
issue is best resolved by the political process, rather than a panel of
72. BICKEL, supra note 45, at 51 (stating that the judiciary is a political institution
because it retains the power to adjudicate some cases and not others). Bickel there-
fore advocates that the Court not decide cases that are political in nature because the
judiciary is a branch that is "electorally irresponsible and has not earth to draw
strength from." Id. at 75. This is the basis of the political question doctrine. Id.
73. Cf. C.L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights,
HARPER'S, Feb. 1961, at 63, in Bickel, supra note 45, at 56 (suggesting the Court main-
tain an absolutist position in deciding cases before it).
74. Norman Dorsen, Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 840,
845 (1989).
75. Id.
76. See BICKEL, supra note 45, at 26. Bickel notes the power of the Court "to
appeal to men's better nature, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been
forgotten in the moment's hue and cry." Id.
77. Id. at 18.
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id.; see also Thayer, supra note 45, at 149.
80. BICKEL, supra note 45, at 18. Bickel emphasizes the political process and the
cooperation between the legislative and executive branches to "cure inequities of
over- and under-representation." Id. Also, the legislature has the ability to respond
to changes in the polls, which reinforces the will of the majority. Id. at 17-18.
81. Id. at 20.
82. Id. (referring to Judge Learned Hand's belief that his vote was "illusory").
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id. at 20.
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nine justices. 85 Bickel questions the authority of the Court to su-
pervise this process and contends that the legislature is better able
to respond to the changing needs of society. 86
C. Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy attempts to blur the dichotomy between
constitutional democracy and representative democracy.87 Cass
Sunstein's theory of deliberative democracy rests on the assump-
tion that the founding fathers intended to spur substantive debate
among government officials and the citizenry.88 Sunstein's position
is that law is created by the people and should be upheld by the
people. In defending that position, Sunstein challenges the tradi-
tional understanding of status-quo neutrality.89 Status quo neutral-
ity is the concept that anything that disturbs existing legal
entitlements in society is unjust, and anything that reinforces these
distributions is neutral and just.90 However, because these existing
distributions are primarily a product of law, and because law is cre-
ated by and for the people, this theory is inherently misconceived. 91
People are afraid to actively interpret the text of the Constitution
for fear that they may disturb some natural force that does not
really exist. 92
As a result, Sunstein seeks to abandon the baseline of status quo
neutrality and replace it with one that requires an active citizenry.93
In this way, Sunstein's theory of deliberative democracy is similar
85. Id. at 22 (referring to Thayer's assumption that reliance on the courts will
"dwarf the political capacity of the people"). Id.
86. Id. at 23 (suggesting that society should not rely on the Court to save itself
from ruin).
87. Id. at 27. Bickel stresses the power of the "majority to displace the decision-
makers." See also Thayer, supra note 45, at 144.
88. CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 142 (1993).
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id. at 3. Sunstein argues that rights are really a product of societal debate and
should not be treated as a part of nature. Though nature is not a poor justification for
law, it should not be viewed as the rationale for law. In other words, citizens should
not be scared to change law for fear of going against nature because laws are really a
product of citizens' debates and not nature. Id. Sunstein's challenge rests on the
assumption that existing distributions are inherently biased: "Respect for existing dis-
tributions is neutral only if existing distributions are themselves neutral." Id. at 6.
Hence, it does not make sense to treat the status quo neutrality as superior to the laws
that aim to change the status quo. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. "The basic problem with status quo neutrality is that it shuts off, at the
wrong stage, the American system of deliberative democracy. It refuses to subject
existing legal practice to democratic scrutiny." Id.
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to representative democracy.94 Sunstein believes that although ju-
dicial review should not be used frequently, when it is used, it
should be used aggressively. This will only be necessary in two in-
stances: when rights that are central to the democratic process are
at stake or when groups are unlikely to receive fair treatment in
the legislative process.
In conjunction with this argument, Sunstein argues that the Con-
stitution should be interpreted outside the courts. According to
Sunstein, the Founders created the Bill of Rights in an effort to
appeal to the citizenry. 96 Sunstein emphasizes that the Constitu-
tion was written for everyone, "not simply the judges. ' 97 As such,
it should be actively interpreted by everyone.98
A court-centered constitutional scheme is unfavorable for sev-
eral reasons. First, reliance on the judicial system may distract at-
tention from other more effective strategies. 99 Though taking away
attention from the judiciary may result in a focus on politics, Sun-
stein views this as a positive result.10 He criticizes Dworkin's insis-
tence that the court is the "only principled institution" '' and
maintains that the other branches of government better reflect the
tradition of "principled deliberation. 1 ° 2 Sunstein also advocates
an interpretation of the Constitution outside the courts because ju-
dicial decisions are often ineffective.'0 3 Finally, elected officials
and ordinary citizens should bear part of the burden of social re-
94. Id. at 135-36. Though all decisions do not have to be made by all citizens, "[a]
system in which such participation is lacking is to that extent a failure." Id. at 135.
95. Id. at 104.
96. Id. at 142-43. Judicial restraint is especially admirable in areas of social re-
form. Id. at 8. Sunstein believes that the primary purpose of judicial review is to
reinforce existing democratic processes, rather than supplanting substantive values.
The latter is best left to the political process. Id. at 104. See also ELY, supra note 15,
at 72. See also Thayer, supra note 45, at 144. Thayer's "clear mistake doctrine" sup-
ports Sunstein's idea that judicial review should be used sparingly. See supra notes
50-53 and accompanying text.
97. Id. James Madison envisioned the public protecting itself, rather than the judi-
ciary: "[A] bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to the sense of the com-
munity." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1778), in
SUNSTEIN, supra note 87, at 9.
98. Id. at 9.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 145.
101. Id. Politics "can inculcate political commitments, broader understandings,
feelings of citizenship, and dedication to the community." Id.
102. Id. at 146 (referring to RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985));
see also supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
103. SUNSTEIN, supra note 87, at 146. Sunstein cites as examples of this delibera-
tion, "the labor movement, the New Deal, the environmental movement, the deregu-
lation movement, and the women's movement." Id.
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form.104 Because judges are not experts and do not represent the
citizenry, other entities should take responsibility for society.10 5
Although it limits the role of the courts, deliberative democracy
does not entail unlimited majoritarianism10 6 The judiciary does
have a significant, "though secondary," role to play.10 7 When
judges interpret the Constitution, they should abandon their own
views because they owe a duty of loyalty to the Constitution. Im-
partiality will ensure that the status quo is subject to the demo-
cratic process, which, Sunstein believes, is the bottom line of
deliberative democracy. 108
Because preferences have been created by legal rules, it is not
always acceptable for judges to yield to the will of the majority
preferences. 10 9 In many situations, a judiciary which departs from
the status quo can actually "reflect the democratic aspirations of its
citizenry." 110 In this way, public-regarding decisions at times may
be at times inconsistent with the very nature of government."' It is
necessary for decision-makers to rely on its own instincts of what is
just, rather than defer to the majority. Of course, this "instinct" is
fueled by the Constitution. In this way, deliberative democracy re-
sembles constitutional democracy.
Deliberative democracy, therefore, seeks to synthesize the idea
that decisions reflect what the public wants with the concept of loy-
alty to the Constitution. In confronting this tension, citizens, to-
104. Id. Although Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is often cited
as an example of judicial triumph, it is actually Sunstein's premiere example of judi-
cial weakness. SUNSTEIN, supra note 87, at 146. Though the Supreme Court at-
tempted to effectuate social reform in the area of desegregation, no real progress was
made until Congress and the President got involved. Id.
105. Id. at 147.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 11. A look back at the founding of our country indicates that the fram-
ers did not intend our government to run by complete deference to the majority. Id.
at 19. While the Articles of Confederation allowed private interest groups to domi-
nate government, the new Constitution sought to remedy this. Id. In effect, delibera-
tive democracy was created as an attempt to hold officials accountable while at the
same time not allowing factions to dominate government. Id. at 19-20.
108. Id. at 11.
109. Id. at 149. Sunstein views the courts as simply another branch of government
that has the authority and the responsibility to "allow democratic politics to alter
existing distributions." Id.
110. Id. at 162-63. Sunstein explores the approach that a deliberative democracy
should take in making decisions that alter the status quo. Though deference to the
majority is often viewed as respecting existing distributions, Sunstein argues that be-
cause many of these distributions are inherently unjust, laws which do not yield to the
status quo are often acceptable and even encouraged. Id.
111, Id. at 11.
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gether with the courts and legislature, should debate issues in a
way that is commensurate with the common good. Rather than
rely on the courts or the political process, deliberative democracy
primarily relies on an active citizenry to create and enforce its laws.
Such deliberation should then be reflected in judicial decisions.
II. THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN WORLD WAR II:
A HISTORICAL LOOK BACK
Throughout history, the Court has adopted, rejected, and modi-
fied the theories of constitutional and representative democracy.
In times of crisis, the judiciary has been forced to reevaluate its
role in maintaining order and securing civil liberties. 112 Since the
United States has not been faced with a continuous threat to its
national security,' 1 3 the judiciary has not developed a consistent
jurisprudence for balancing national security with the protection of
civil liberties." 4 The situation involving the Japanese internment
during World War II exemplifies this tension.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
many West Coast residents grew fearful of Japanese-Americans. 115
Though the Japanese had begun to settle on the West Coast before
the turn of the century, they retained a separate and distinct
lifestyle." 6
The U.S. government set up a commission to determine how the
Japanese carried out the Pearl Harbor attacks. 1 7 The Commission,
which was chaired by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, found
that spies in Hawaii had collected and transmitted information to
Japan. Following the Roberts Commission's fact-finding report,
government officials called for the relocation of persons of Japa-
nese ancestry living on the West Coast.1 8 Overwhelming public
sentiment indicated that citizens feared another Japanese inva-
sion. 119 Furthermore, some public officials believed that people of
Japanese ancestry should be relocated to protect them from hate
112. Id. at 25.
113. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 16.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. REHNQUIST, supra note 13, at 188.
117. Id. at 188.
118. Id. at 188-89.
119. Id. Japanese espionage was especially active during the weeks leading up to
the attack on Pearl Harbor. Id. As a result, the Japanese were certain of the exact
location of air fields and hangars-knowledge that was crucial in carrying out the
attack. Id. at 190. It should be noted, however, that President Roosevelt authorized
the War Department to prepare for the evacuation of the Japanese two days before
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crimes. 120 Opposition from civil liberties groups was evident but
not strong enough to make an impact. 121
On February 19, 1942, nearly seventy days after the attack on
Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Execu-
tive Order 9066 (the "Order"), which authorized the removal of
ethnic Japanese from the West Coast.122 Congress subsequently
passed several measures which criminalized violations of this Or-
der or any regulation that might be issued to implement the
Order. 1
23
In Korematsu v. United States, 24 the Supreme Court was asked
to rule on the constitutionality of the relocation requirement.1 25
The year before, in Hirabayashi v. United States, 26 the Court had
held that the curfew requirement for Japanese residents was consti-
tutional.2 7 Chief Justice Stone, writing for the Court in Hiraba-
yashi, avoided answering the larger question of the validity of the
relocation requirement. 128 Nevertheless, Stone limited the jurisdic-
tion of the Court by concluding that the actions of the executive
and Congress need only have a rational basis. 29 Stone found that
the avoidance of espionage and sabotage by Japanese Americans
the final recommendation was even completed. Id. at 191 (citing FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN
BRIEF AUTHORITY 250 (1962).
120. Id. at 188.
121. E.g., MURPHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 88.
122. E.g., id. at 88; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 13, at 191. Attorney General
Francis Biddle later acknowledged that the military might have been wrong in its
determination. Id. Moreover, prior to internment, the Chief of Naval Operations
stated that a full-scale Japanese invasion was "impossible" and the army's general
staff recommended against mass evacuations. LINFIELD, supra note 11, at 93. But the
administration was widely supported by the public, so any opposition was not taken
very seriously. See REHNQUIST, supra note 13, at 219 (citing FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN
BRIEF AUTHORITY (1962)).
123. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). The Order was finally
rescinded by President Gerald Ford in 1976, over thirty years after it was first issued.
LINFIELD, supra note 11, at 96.
124. Some of the these regulations included a curfew; a requirement for ethnic Jap-
anese to report to relocation centers; forced sale of houses and businesses; and reloca-
tion to camps located away from the West Coast. Though there was no physical
brutality of Japanese and Japanese Americans, living conditions were uncomfortable.
Military Areas or Zones, Restrictions, 77 Pub. L. No. 503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
125. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
126. Id. at 216.
127. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
128. Id. at 101; see also MURPHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 89; REHN-
QUIST, supra note 13, at 198.
129. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 105. "It is unnecessary to consider whether or to
what extent such findings would support orders differing from the curfew order." Id.
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was a rational basis for the curfew requirement. 3 ' This was
enough to justify the curfew requirement.13 1
The Court hoped to avoid the war arena by deciding the case on
the narrow grounds of protection against espionage and sabotage.
By the time Korematsu came before the Court in 1944, however,
the initial shock of Pearl Harbor had receded and the Court felt
obligated to go one step further. 132 Fred Korematsu was convicted
for not reporting for relocation in violation of the relocation act.133
After the Ninth Circuit sustained his conviction,3 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 35 Justice Black's opinion began by estab-
lishing the standard of review as strict scrutiny. 36
Purporting to apply this standard, Black found that the regula-
tion at issue was closely related to the threat. 37 He relied on evi-
dence of Japanese disloyalty presented at congressional hearings 138
to find that a significant threat existed. 139 Black went on to justify
the right of the Executive and Legislature to respond to this threat:
"[W]hen under conditions of modern warfare our shores are
130. Id. at 93. "That reasonably prudent men charged with the responsibility of our
national defense had ample grounds for concluding that they must face the danger of
invasion, take measures against it, and in making the choice of measure considered
our internal situation, cannot be doubted." Id. at 94.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 98.
133. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
134. Id. at 215. The Act that Korematsu was convicted of violating was Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34. Congress had enacted this in order to implement Executive
Order 9066. Id. at 216. The American Civil Liberties Union chose Fred Korematsu to
test the constitutionality of the evacuation orders. PAGE SMITH, DEMOCRACY ON
TRIAL: THE JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUATION AND RELOCATION IN WORLD WAR
II 208 (1995).
135. Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1943), affd, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
136. Korematsu v. United States, 321 U.S. 760. Ironically, Justice Black, who wrote
the opinion for the Court, voted against granting certiorari. Chief Justice Stone did
not vote at all. MURPHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 93.
137. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). "It should be noted ...
that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are im-
mediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It
is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. This is the first
time that the Court used the strict scrutiny standard of review and the only time that
the Court upheld a restriction under this standard. See MURPHY, FLEMING & BAR-
BER, supra note 13, at 892. Strict scrutiny requires that a regulation based on race or
ethnicity be a pressing public necessity and narrowly tailored to meet this need. Id.
138. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
139. Id. Such findings indicated that "approximately five thousand American citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States
and to renounce allegiance to the Japanese Emperor." Id.
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threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be com-
mensurate with the threatened danger. '140
Deferring to the powers of the war-making branches of govern-
ment, Black upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 141 Black con-
cluded that it was not the province of the Court to interfere with
the regulation. 42 Although the Court found that a "pressing pub-
lic necessity" probably did not exist by the time the case reached
the Court, the need to prevent against sabotage and espionage at
the time Korematsu violated the Act was sufficient to justify the
relocation. 43
Black's faith in the executive's and Congress's judgment is con-
sistent with Thayer's confidence in elected officials and his "clear
mistake" doctrine. 44 Black believed the Court should interfere
only to the extent necessary to make sure the Act was consistent
with the Constitution. 141 In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter
acknowledged that the military is bound by the confines of the
Constitution. 146 At the same time however, Frankfurter stated that
the "war power of the government is 'the power to wage war suc-
cessfully.' "147 Frankfurter concluded that the Act fell under the
140. Id.
141. Id. at 220.
142. Id. at 223. Black stated that the Court could not reject Congress's view: "We
cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for
believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and sepa-
rately dealt with ..... Id. at 218 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99
(1943). This is actually a lower standard than Black purported to use.
143. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
144. Id. at 219. "We cannot-by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hind-
sight-now say that at that time these actions were unjustified." Id. at 224. Yet hind-
sight, or at least perspective, is precisely what Black employed in his dissents in later
decisions when Communists were prosecuted for their beliefs by the federal govern-
ment. For an example of one such dissent, see American Communications Ass'n. v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950). "Centuries of experience testify that laws aimed at
one political or religious group, however rational these laws may be in their begin-
nings, generate hatreds and prejudices which rapidly spread beyond control." Am.
Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 448 (Black, J., dissenting). Black
spoke of the abstracts embodied in the Constitution that guarantee absolute rights,
free from encroachment by the government: "But not the least of the virtues of the
First Amendment is its protection of each member of the smallest and most unortho-
dox minority." Id.
145. For a detailed discussion of Thayer's thesis, see supra Part I.B. Black deferred
to the war-making branches of government, though he purported to use the strict
scrutiny standard of review. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "The respective spheres of action of
military authorities and of judges are of course very different. But within their
sphere, military authorities are no more outside the bounds of obedience to the Con-
stitution than are judges within theirs." Id.
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powers of Congress: "And being an exercise of the war power ex-
plicitly granted by the Constitution for safeguarding the national
life by prosecuting war effectively, I find nothing in the Constitu-
tion which denies to Congress the power to enforce such a valid
military order by making its violation an offense triable in the civil
courts."148
Both Justices Black and Frankfurter avoided balancing the rights
of Japanese Americans against the interest of national security by
deferring to the other branches of government. 149 They did not
take responsibility for protecting the interests of the interned Japa-
nese Americans. Black discussed the hardships of war, saying only
that "all citizens alike ... feel the impact of war in greater or lesser
measure."' 5 ° The Korematsu majority and concurrence did not
speak of any of the guarantees mentioned in the Bill of Rights,
including equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment. 15' Rather, the majority and concurrence deferred to
the judgments of Congress and the Executive: "That is their busi-
ness, not ours."'' 5 1 This is the very essence of Thayer's representa-
tive democracy. 153
The Korematsu majority insisted that its decision was motivated
solely by the potential danger to national security.' 54 In his dissent,
Justice Murphy accused the majority of being swayed by racism. 155
Though Murphy recognized the need to defer to the military au-
thorities' judgment on the facts of war, he warned of the need for
limits on that deference. 56 The limits on the military's power is a
148. Id. at 223 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943 Hughes, C.J.).
149. Id. at 225.
150. Id. at 223. Cf. Brennan, supra note 16 (advocating balancing rights and pro-
tecting civil liberties).
151. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
152. See 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
154. Supra Part I.B.
155. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. "To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice,
without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses
the issue." Id.
156. Id. at 233 ("Such exclusion goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power'
and falls into the ugly abyss of racism"). In fact, Murphy labeled the majority deci-
sion a "legalization of racism." Id. at 242. Murphy went on to show that contrary to
the majority opinion's findings, there was no evidence of disloyalty by Japanese
Americans. Id. at 219. Further, there was no evidence that Korematsu himself was
disloyal. LINFIELD, supra note 11, at 95. Murphy's accusations of racism have been
confirmed since the decision was handed down in 1944. General John L. DeWitt, in
testimony before the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee, stated, "A Jap's a Jap ....
There is no way to determine their loyalty... It makes no difference whether he is an
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question for the judiciary. 5 7 Murphy argued that the Act deprived
individuals of equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment. 158 Further, no "immediate, imminent and im-
pending"'159 public danger could justify such a racially motivated
restriction. 60
Rather than focusing on the apparent military necessity of the
Act,' 6 ' Murphy focused on the Act's unfairness, calling the deci-
sion "one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of con-
stitutional rights in the history of this nation in the absence of
martial law.' 1 62 He believed that the military relied improperly
upon a racist ideology163 that had persisted for years against Japa-
nese Americans. 64
The United States Government did not find a significant number
of persons of Japanese ancestry to be disloyal.165 Murphy believed
the Act was overbroad and racist and thus should be struck
down. 166 Murphy was also concerned about safeguarding the rights
of minorities in future situations. 67 He warned that the faulty ra-
tionale employed in this case would "encourage and open the door
to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the pas-
sions of tomorrow.' '1 68
Murphy's dissent reflects the constitutional democracy advo-
cated by Dworkin and Brennan advocate. 169 Although the public
supported the holding in Korematsu,7 ° this should not have pre-
vented the Court from actively correcting the false assumptions
American; theoretically he is still a Japanese and you can't change him." RICHARD
DRINNON, KEEPER OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS 31 (1987). Furthermore, the Con-
gressional Commission on Wartime Relocation unanimously concluded in 1983 that
the Order had been prompted by "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of politi-
cal leadership." PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE IN-
TERNMENT CASES 362 (1983).
157. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234.
158. Id. (citing Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932)).
159. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234.
160. Id.
161. Id. Murphy was wary of the assumptions upon which the military based its
judgments. 323 U.S. at 236-39.
162. Id. at 223.
163. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235.
164. Supra note 155 and accompanying text.
165. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239.
166. Id. at 219.
167. Id. at 240.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See supra Part I.A.
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upon which judicial decisions can be made. 171 Specifically, Murphy
criticized the majority's racism and deprivation of liberties of Japa-
nese and Japanese Americans. 172 Murphy envisioned the Constitu-
tion as a guarantor of freedom during peacetime and wartime
alike. 73
Justice Jackson, also dissenting, criticized the majority's accept-
ance of the military decision. Though the military may have acted
appropriately given the expediency of the situation, 74 Jackson ar-
gued the Court should still determine whether it acted within con-
stitutional boundaries.175 Though Jackson would have preferred to
stop with Hirabayashi, he believed the Court could not forsake its
duty to determine the constitutionality of the Order.176 To do so
would have left the country at the mercy of the military.1 77 Rather,
the Court should have reviewed the constitutionality of such or-
ders.178 Military orders end with emergencies, but judicial opinions
have lasting consequences.179 As Jackson stated, "[A] judicial con-
struction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a
far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order
itself." 80 In accordance with democratic constitutionalism,' 81 Jack-
son believed that allegiance to the Constitution is an essential safe-
171. See, e.g., MURPHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 100.
172. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also DWORKIN, supra
note 15, at 257-58. Dworkin rejects the simple majoritarian theory of government and
advocates an active role of the judiciary. Id.
173. If the public had been correctly informed about the unsubstantiated threat
that the Japanese residents posed to our nation, sentiment might have been different.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (holding that no public neces-
sity existed to justify the suspension of habeas corpus in Hawaii after the war had
ended). But see MURPHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 1364 (stating there
was a significant fear of invasion at that time).
174. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting). "They must accordingly
be treated at all times as the heirs of the American experiment, and as entitled to all
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. See also Brennan, supra
note 16.
175. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson acknowledged
that "The armed services must protect a society, not merely its Constitution." Id.
176. Id. at 245. "[E]ven if they were permissible military procedures, I deny that it
follows that they are constitutional." Id.; see also id. at 246 ("A military commander
may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review
and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution."); Bren-
nan, supra note 16.
MURPHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 93.
177. Id.
178. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id. "[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it con-
forms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle
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guard against the infringement of civil liberties. 182 He feared that
the hesitance of the Court to get involved would lead to abuse of
power by elected officials: "The principle then lies about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.' 83
This "loaded weapon" Jackson spoke of apparently had already
been picked up by dangerous hands-the Korematsu majority. By
relying on Hirabayashi,84 the majority affirmed the military's or-
ders.185 But Jackson attacked the Court's circular reasoning: 86
"The Court is now saying that in Hirabayashi we did decide the
very things we there said we were not deciding."' 87
Jackson wanted the Court to actively review not only the deci-
sions of the other branches of government, but those of the judici-
ary as well.' 88 Once a Court establishes a principle, it becomes
doctrine until a subsequent Court actively overrules it.' 89 The
Court has not yet overruled Korematsu.'90
of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citi-
zens." Id. at 246; see also MURPHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 94.
181. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245-46.
182. See Brennan, supra note 23.
183. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 246. Jackson was concerned about people coming to power that would
not uphold the principles embodied in the Constitution. "If the people ever let com-
mand of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts
wield no power equal to its restraint." Id. at 248. This resounds of Brennan's speech,
supra note 16, in which he feared what would happen when men of abusive power
came to power. Here, Jackson was concerned that the Constitution must be protected
against all those in power, including judges. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246.
185. 320 U.S. at 81.
186. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217 (holding that the precedent established in Hiraba-
yashi precludes the Court from holding that Congress and the Executive lacked the
authority to exclude those of Japanese ancestry).
187. Id. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
188. Id. The Court in Hirabayashi-the same Court that sat on the bench to hear
the Korematsu decision-expressly limited its discussion to the issue of review and
declined to address the constitutionality of the exclusion issue.
189. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson, in response to
the Court's illogical conclusion in Korematsu, said "How far the principle of this case
would be extended before plausible reasons would play out, I do not know." Id.
190. See, e.g., supra note 179.
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III. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
If I see someone come in and he's got a diaper on his head and a
fan belt around that diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pul-
led over and checked.191
-Rep. John Cooksey of Louisiana
A new racism has surfaced in the aftermath of September 11.
Rather than targeting African Americans, or Japanese Ameri-
cans,192 perpetrators have committed hate crimes against Arab
Americans. 193 Shortly after the terrorist attacks, four men of Arab
descent were asked to get off an airplane because of complaints
from the passengers. 194
Further, the public appears to accept this new type of profil-
ing.195 In a poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times, sixty-eight
percent of those polled favored allowing law enforcement to ran-
domly stop people who fit the profile of suspected terrorists. 96
Further, a recent study shows that sixty-four percent of Americans
191. Though the Court has never explicitly overruled Korematsu, there have been
several implicit admissions of guilt. In 1948, Congress passed the Japanese-Americans
Evacuations Claim Act to help compensate some of the victims of the evacuation. 50
App. U.S.C.A. §1981 (1948). Further, in 1984 the U.S. District Court vacated Kore-
matsu's conviction. Korematsu v. U.S. 584 F. Supp. 1406 (D.C. Cal. 1984).
192. See Cooksey Backs Profiling Individuals of Arab Descent, CONG. DAILY, Sept.
19, 2001, at 11. Although Cooksey later recanted this statement, he justified his posi-
tion: "When you've got a group of people who are not American citizens, who are of
Arab descent and they were involved in killing 5,000 Americans ... I think we can
and should scrutinize people that fit that profile until this war on terrorism is over."
Id.
193. Statistics indicate that, in the weeks following September 11, discrimination
complaints dropped sharply nationwide among African Americans, while complaints
by Arabs and Middle Easterners increased dramatically. Kevin Murphy, Discrimina-
tion Complaints Drop Nationwide Following Terrorism Attacks, WORLD REP., Nov. 8,
2001; see also Sherry Colb, The New Face of Racial Profiling: How Terrorism Affects
the Debate, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/2OOllOlO.html (Oct. 10, 2001)
194. E.g., Bush, supra note 8. For further recounts of prejudice against Arab
Americans, see, for example, John Dean, Why Middle Eastern Immigrants Are Wor-
ried: Reasonable Fears, Difficult Law Enforcement Problems, at http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/deanI20011012.html (Oct. 12, 2001).
195. See John Derbyshire, A (Potentially) Useful Tool, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Winter 2001-02, at 67. Authorities later apologized for this incident. See Elaine
Jarvik, Utahns Reflect on Life After 9/11, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 25, 2001, at Al.
196. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 192. Colb suggests that because the overwhelming
majority of terrorists are of Arab descent, those who have opposed racial profiling
may now think that racial profiling of Arab Americans is acceptable. In comparison
to the profiling of African Americans, which is done mostly for the purpose of finding
drug dealers, profiling of Arab Americans now may prevent terrorism, an arguably
much more urgent and pressing problem. Id.
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now trust the federal government to do the right thing almost al-
ways or at least most of the time. 197
The question therefore becomes, how should America respond
to the September 11 terrorist attack? The nation has been, more or
less, blessed with continuous safety, interrupted only by intermit-
tent threats. 98 As a result, it has not developed a jurisprudence
ready to deal with crises of the magnitude of the September 11
events. 199
Shifts in public sentiment indicate that changes in how our coun-
try responds may be forthcoming. Before September 11, people
were very hesitant to accept any government proposal that would
impinge on civil liberties.20 0 Following the attacks, sixty-one per-
cent of Americans think that it will be necessary for the average
person to surrender some civil liberties. 201 While government was
once seen as the main threat to our liberties, it may now be seen as
the solution.2 °2 According to some, terrorism has replaced govern-
ment as the most significant threat to our freedom.0 3
A. USA PATRIOT Act
In the aftermath of September 11, a bipartisan Congress acted
quickly to enact one of the most sweeping antiterrorism bills in
history.20 4 The sentiment and regret that followed the Korematsu
197. Mark Z. Barabak, America Attacked Times Poll: U.S. Keen to Avenge Attacks,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at Al (polling a national sample of 1561 adults). See also
Derbyshire, supra note 194, at 70 (maintaining that profiling is acceptable "so long as
the authorities treat everyone with courtesy and apologize to the inconvenienced in-
nocent"). But see Tribe, supra note 23 (warning that using racial characteristics to
identify terrorists is unnecessary because we have technology that can detect individ-
ual suspects). Further, we should be careful not to set a dangerous precedent. Id.
198. Robin Toner, Now, Government is the Solution, Not the Problem, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2001, at 14. Following the 1960s, there was a dramatic decline in public trust,
as well as civic engagement. Robert Putnam, The Strange Disappearance of Civic
America, AM. PROSPECT, 1996, at 24, 36 (commenting on the decline in civic participa-
tion in America over the last several decades). This statistic is remarkable in light of
the 2000 presidential election controversy and the low approval ratings of the Presi-
dent and Congress shortly thereafter.
199. Brennan, supra note 16.
200. Id.
201. Amitai Etzioni, Rights and Responsibilities, 2001, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Winter 20010-02, at 5 (predicting that the events of September 11 will have long-
reaching effects on our attitude toward government).
202. Barabak, supra note 196.
203. Toner, supra note 197.
204. Etzioni, supra note 200.
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decision °5 have rendered the possibility of facially discriminatory
legislation unlikely. But laws that surreptitiously impinge on the
civil liberties of minorities may be passed.2 °6 Though these laws
may meet the demands of the public for greater security, the civil
liberties of many minorities, and perhaps all of us, are at stake.
On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("PA-
TRIOT Act").20 7 The PATRIOT Act is designed to effectively
prosecute those responsible for the events of September 11 and
similar incidents, as well as to prevent future attacks.20 8 At the
same time, the Act purports to protect the civil rights and liberties
of all Americans.20 9
Some of the PATRIOT Act's provisions purport to do little more
than strengthen existing laws. For example, Section 105 requires
that the Director of the U.S. Secret Service develop a national net-
work of electronic crime task forces to "prevent, detect, and inves-
tigate various forms of electronic crimes. ' 210  As a result, the
government will be better able to trace criminal activity by anyone
who tries to interfere with computer infrastructure. Few would ar-
205. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat 272.
206. See supra note 190. Justice Douglas, who joined the Korematsu majority and
had shied away from writing a dissent, admitted that he had made a mistake: "I caved
in." MURPHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 98. Criticism of the decision
came from several different sources. Lt. Felix F. Stumpf had written to Justice Jack-
son that the decision "is the type of blow from which we cannot recover so easily. It
introduces racialism, the very racialism we are fighting so strenuously to eliminate...
[Through that decision] the Court has ... deprived an American citizen of his rights,
utterly devitalizing the constitutional principles which are included in the word 'citi-
zen.' Lt. Felix F. Stumpf to Robert H. Jackson, Apr. 18, 1945; Jackson Papers, Box -
132, in MURPHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 99. For further criticism of
the rationale behind the Korematsu decision, see Mari J. Matsuda, McCarthyism, the
Internment and the Contradictions of Power, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 9, 17-18
(1998). Matsuda is skeptical of the Court's justification of military necessity; she sees
race as the Court's motivating factor. Id. For further criticism of the conclusions
drawn by the majority, see Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54
YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
207. For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court struck
down a statute that although purporting to treat everyone alike, had a disparate im-
pact on minorities. See also Cole, supra note 10, at 48 (cautioning that in the wake of
September 11, we should only accept legislation applied to all people equally).
208. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 272.
209. Id. § 102.
210. Id. § 102.
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gue that such authority to stamp out crime impinges on civil
liberties.
The PATRIOT Act's attempt to strengthen intelligence mecha-
nisms will not likely be met with much opposition. For example,
the PATRIOT Act requires that the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion ("FBI") provide airlines access to the names of passengers
who are suspected of terrorist activity. 21' Because one of the pri-
mary complaints of September 11 was that several of the people on
the passenger list were on the FBI's ten most wanted list, few will
oppose this measure.212
Though some of the PATRIOT Act's provisions explicitly
change existing laws, even civil libertarians acknowledge the need
for some change.213 Immigration laws have, for example, been
tightened under the PATRIOT Act. 14 The threat of terrorism has
caused many people to change their views about profiling and re-
lated detention.215 The FBI now has the power to detain and de-
port any alien if there is "reason to believe [the alien] may further
or facilitate acts of terrorism" or "any other activity that endangers
the security of the United States. 2 16 Further, an alien's privilege
211. Id. § 105.
212. Id. § 1009.
213. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Crackdown: Should We Be Worried About the New
Antiterrorism Legislation? NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 56, 58. ("It's mind boggling
that information exists in the U.S., even in.the F.B.I., and it's not being used to pro-
tect people .... On Sept. 11, we realized that we couldn't debate it philosophically
anymore." (quoting Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Criminal Division)).
214. See, e.g., id. "The current investigation so far, reflects a change in emphasis
and focus, rather than a more dramatic change in kind." Id. (referring to the PA-
TRIOT Act's granting of authority to detain material witnesses who violate immigra-
tion laws, not Bush's executive order). But see Cole, supra note 10 (criticizing the
extraordinary number of people who are harmed by the amended immigration provi-
sions of the PATRIOT Act).
215. E.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 402, 115
Stat 272 (tripling the number of Border Patrol, Customs Service and INS personnel).
See also § 416 (directing the Attorney General to expand foreign student monitoring
to include air flight training, language training, and vocational school attendance).
216. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Hue and Murmur Over Curbed Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2001, at B8. ("The traditional way we balance these things is with the maxim,
'It's better that ten guilty men go free than one innocent man be in jail.' I think
people are a little nervous about applying that maxim where the ten guilty men who
are going free could have biological weapons." (quoting Michael C. Dorf, professor of
constitutional law at Columbia University)). Belluck also notes that Peter J. Rubin, a
Georgetown University law professor, has no problem with questioning or detaining
new immigrants so long as there are limits to this power. Even civil libertarian Lau-
rence H. Tribe, a professor at Harvard Law School, has changed his perspective signif-
icantly since September 11. "The prospect of someone who might be a material
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to remain in the United States may be withdrawn.217 People are
more willing to accept some infringements on civil liberties in ex-
change for better security. 18 Section 206, for example, allows for
expanded roving surveillance so that the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court could authorize wiretaps without a showing of
probable cause of crime. 19 Though this will greatly expand the
power of the government to conduct electronic surveillance, such
authority may be necessary given the current threat of terrorism.2 2 0
There are, however, several provisions of the PATRIOT Act
which civil libertarians strongly oppose. One such measure is Sec-
tion 218, which amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 ("FISA").22 ' FISA was enacted in 1978 following Water-
gate and the Supreme Court's holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection against unreasonable searches covered
wiretaps.22 The original FISA required that the "primary pur-
pose" of surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion.2 23  But following September 11, the standard has been
lowered.2 2 4 Now, so long as a "significant purpose" of the surveil-
lance is to obtain foreign intelligence information, the search will
be permissible.225  David Chertoff, assistant attorney general in
witness being held indefinitely is scary. But the idea that someone might be released
and then go and blow up Cleveland is scarier still." Id.
217. See Mark Krikorian, Immigration: A Privilege or a Right? 12 THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY 1,-46 (Winter 2001/02). See also Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, 115 Stat 272.
218. Krikorian, supra note 216, at 47.
219. See, e.g., Krikorian, supra note 216, at 46 (suggesting that the new immigration
provisions are entirely constitutional).
220. Section 206 amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50
U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B), to grant roving surveillance authority for the purpose of fur-
nishing necessary information that may be helpful in an investigation. Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 206, 115 Stat 272.
221. See, e.g., William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001,
at A31 (calling on the government to hold onto American liberties while defending
our country against those who are trying to trump our freedom).
222. 50 U.S.C. 1805 (1978).
223. See Toobin, supra note 212, at 58-9.
224. 50 U.S.C. 1805 (1978), amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 15 Stat 272.
225. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 15 Stat
272.
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charge of the Department of Justice's Criminal Division, justifies
this rule based on the need for change in law enforcement.226
Many have criticized this change as unconstitutional. The new
standard leaves open the possibility that factors beside national se-
curity may influence the issuance of warrants. Sen. Russell Fein-
gold, for example, the only senator to vote against the PATRIOT
Act, cited this section as one of the main reasons for his voting
against it.227
In remarks delivered to Congress, Senator Feingold criticized the
PATRIOT Act in its entirety. 228 He warned that the new legisla-
tion would endanger those liberties the United States is fighting to
protect.229 Citing examples of history where the U.S. government
deprived citizens of their constitutional freedoms, Feingold im-
plored Congress not to make the same mistake again.230 Neverthe-
less, the PATRIOT Act passed with overwhelming support.231
B. Bush's Executive Order
Perhaps even more controversial than the PATRIOT Act is Pres-
ident Bush's Executive Order ("Executive Order"), establishing
military tribunals for suspected terrorists.232 The Executive Order
allows foreigners 233 charged with terrorism to be tried in secret
tribunals outside of the United States. 3 Traditionally, suspected
226. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat
272.
227. See Toobin, supra note 212, at 60 (noting that while the old language separated
law enforcement into foreign intelligence and law-enforcement, the new situation
abolishes this distinction).
228. See Toobin, supra note 212, at 60 "'It's the Attorney General's private play-
ground,' he argued in opposition to this lower standard." Id.
229. A Broad Search for Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at B4.
230. Id. ("It is very important that we give the Department of Justice and the intel-
ligence agencies the tools they need to combat and prevent terrorism. But it is also
crucial that civil liberties in this country be preserved, otherwise I'm afraid that terror
will win this battle without firing a shot.").
231. Id.
232. The PATRIOT Act passed the Senate 98 yeas to 1 nay. 147 Cong. Rec. D1053-
02.
233. Military Order issued on Nov. 13, 2001 by President George W. Bush. 66 Fed.
Reg. 222 (Nov. 26, 2001). Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO1/
11/20011113-27.html.
234. In January 2002, the United States Armed Forces transferred thousands of
captives allegedly connected to the AI-Qaeda network to the United States Naval
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Though non-citizens are not entitled to the same
rights as citizens, many disagree, arguing that the prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay
following September 11 should be given more protections. Following a petition made
by civil rights advocates, a federal court in California concluded that the 1949 Geneva
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terrorists have been tried in regular courts. 235 The President cited
the need to protect the country against terrorism as the driving
force behind this order: "It is not practicable to apply in military
commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States District Courts. 236
The Bush Administration believes that a drastic change is neces-
sary to prevent future attacks and to punish terrorists appropri-
ately.237 Insisting that foreign terrorists "do not deserve the
protection of the American Constitution, 2 38 Attorney General
John Ashcroft justifies the Executive Order on grounds of public
necessity. 239 President Bush has steadfastly maintained that mili-
tary tribunals are the only appropriate response during this time of
crisis: "The enemy has declared war on us. And we must not let
foreign enemies use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty
itself. "240
The Bush and Ashcroft justifications have engendered much op-
position. 4' One commentator decried the Executive Order as a
sacrifice of American institutions and liberties: "It's time for con-
servative iconoclasts and card-carrying hard-liners to stand up for
American values. '242
Convention affords the prisoners some rights. Their claim however, was denied be-
cause the petitioners lacked standing to file this suit. Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, No.
CV 02-570 AHM (JTLX), 2002 WL 272428, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2002). If they
are prisoners at war, the captives should be afforded more liberties than they are
currently receiving. See What's News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at Al.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., U.S. v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998). Though a suspected
terrorist, Timothy McVeigh received a fair trial before being convicted of the bomb-
ing of the Oklahoma City federal building in 1998.
237. Qu Arlen Specter, Questioning the President's Authority, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2001 (quoting President George W. Bush).
238. E.g., Robin Toner, Civil Liberty Vs. Security: Finding a Wartime Balance? N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at Al (defending President Bush's Executive Order, Vice Presi-
dent Dick Cheney proclaimed, "This is a war against terrorism. Where military jus-
tice is called for, military justice will be dispensed.").
239. Clyde Haberman, A Widening Rout, Civil Liberties, A Red Cross Retreat, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, (Nation Challenged), at 1.
240. Ashcroft, supra note 7.
241. David E. Sanger, President Defends Military Tribunals in Terrorist Cases: Foe
Has Declared War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at Al.
242. E.g., Cole, Liberties in a Time of Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at 29 ("Pre-
cisely because the terrorists violated all principles of decency and law, we must hold
fast to ours."); see also Haberman, supra note 238, at 1; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al
Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A23 (main-
taining that it would do justice to America to see the terrorists tried in public).
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Critics also maintain that the Executive Order unacceptably
profiles Arab Americans.243 The power of the executive branch to
question and try thousands of Middle Eastern men at special mili-
tary tribunals may threaten the principle of equality. The Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union has condemned the Executive Order as a
"dragnet approach that is likely to magnify concerns of racial and
ethnic profiling. 244
Congress is also concerned that the Executive Order gives too
much power to the President. Even conservative congressmen
have expressed dissatisfaction that Congress was not made party to
the drafting of the Executive Order.245 Civil libertarians fear that
the new system will weaken the institution of checks and bal-
ances.246 Republican senators, including Arlen Specter of Penn-
sylvania, maintain that the administration has not conclusively
demonstrated a need to change the rules so drastically.247 Senator
Specter argues that the involvement of Congress and the courts is
necessary to respond to terrorism in a way that will safeguard civil
liberties.248
IV. WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY SHOULD THE
NATION EMBRACE?
In the midst of this debate is the crucial question of what kind of
democracy the nation should embrace in the aftermath of the ter-
rorist attacks on September 11, 2001. President Bush's Executive
Order establishing military tribunals to try suspected terrorists ar-
guably resembles Executive Order 9066, in which Franklin D.
Roosevelt authorized the removal of ethnic Japanese from the
West Coast.249
243. Safire, supra note 220, at A31; see also A Travesty of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 2001, at A24 (suggesting that the Executive Order signals "a lack of confidence in
the case against the terrorists and in the nation's democratic institutions.").
244. E.g., Haberman, supra note 238, at 1.
245. Elisabeth Bemiller & David Johnston, Bush Sets Option of Military Trials in
Terrorist Cases: Al Qaeda is the Target, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at B8 (evaluating
President Bush's plan to try suspected terrorists in secret tribunals).
246. See Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. and Senate Clash Over Bush Actions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B7 (describing Republican Senator Arlen Specter's discon-
tent that Congress was not consulted).
247. E.g., Safire, supra note 220, at A31.
248. See Specter, supra note 236.
249. Id.
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A. Constitutional Democracy and Representative Democracy
Will Not Work
September 11 may simply be another chapter in the debate be-
tween defending our country and safeguarding our civil liberties
during times of crisis."' 0 Many have argued for a constitutional de-
mocracy approach to the threat of terrorism. For Dworkin and
Brennan, the judiciary is in the best position to interpret the Con-
stitution.251 Rather than defer to the majority, the government
should safeguard the rights of all citizens, including Arab
Americans.
Many have acknowledged the importance of protecting Ameri-
cans on their own soil.2 52 Some have warned, however, that we
must not "sacrifice our constitutional commitments to freedom '2z53
and that we should learn from Korematsu.254 Though the issues
that will arise, and the problems that are likely to develop, as a
result of this terrorism crisis will be new and different, the funda-
mental guarantees of our Constitution-security and liberty-still
remain the same. 5
Ultimately, however, a constitutional democracy approach will
not work. The events of September 11 differ from the events of the
post World War II era in several ways. First, terrorism presents a
threat that is different from any other threat that the United States
has encountered. 56 Though the ultimate objective of terrorism is
political,257 the enemy implements its goals by destruction. 8 Un-
like traditional warfare, the enemy is not easily identifiable. It is a
250. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). See also Toner, supra
note 237, at B6 (recounting President Roosevelt's internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War II, as well as tribunals established during World War II that tried
German saboteurs).
251. See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 212 at 57.
252. See supra Part I.A.
253. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing); Cole, supra note 241, at 29; David Garrow, Another Lesson From World War 11
Internments, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001 (Week in Review), at 6. Garrow warns that a
"loaded weapon" still stands ready to be abused by those in power. Id. These histori-
cal lessons should teach us that government crackdowns based solely upon race or
ethnicity are wrong. Further, the reluctance of the judiciary to get involved is danger-
ous. Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority? N.Y. TIMES Sept.
20, 2001, at 14 (discussing Mary Dudziak's warning that judges should establish new
principles rather than rely on possibly outdated precedents).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Cole, supra note 241.
257. Ashcroft, supra note 7, at 16 (indicating that our laws are ill-equipped to face
the threat of terrorism).
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war waged by individuals, and suspects do not always fit a specific
profile.259  This makes an effective response all the more
difficult.26°
Further, civilians' lives are at stake.261 As horrible as it was, the
attack at Pearl Harbor was an attack on our military base.262 It was
a statement of military power.2 63 The terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, on the other hand, were targeted at random, innocent civil-
ians.2 64 The victims were not people in the military who had
volunteered to risk their lives to defend their country. Rather, they
were an assortment of blue and white collar civilian workers.
Lastly, the threat of an attack on American soil has never been
so great. Though terrorism has been a threat for decades, 65 previ-
ous attacks were made on foreign soil. 266 The frequency and sever-
ity of terrorist attacks in the past decade 267 have not alarmed most
American citizens.2 68 Americans are now more concerned that the
government will fail to prevent terrorism than they are that the
government will infringe upon civil liberties.
269
As a result of these differences, some commentators have es-
poused representative democracy as the best response to Septem-
258. HEYMANN, supra note 4, at xi. For example, Muslim fundamentalists are often
motivated by their hatred for all things American, both cultural and economic. Id. at
X.
259. As President Bush said in his address to the nation on September 20, 2001,,
"The enemy lurks in our shadows." Bush, supra note 8. In contrast to the attack on
Pearl Harbor, no one has taken responsibility for the September 11 terrorist acts. See
also A.L. DeWitt, The Ultimate Exigent Circumstance, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 169
(1996) (suggesting that the biggest threat to our country is one from within our
borders).
260. See Bush, supra note 8.
261. Id. Though the internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans during World
War II was unjustified, it was at least "a declared war, with identified enemies." Id.
In contrast, terrorist suspects are harder to identify. Id.
262. Id. ("[P]erhaps no threat to our constitutional form of government looms as
large as that posed by terrorist acts that are directed at domestic civilian targets dur-
ing peacetime.").
263. Kmiec, supra note 23 (labeling the terrorist acts of September 11 as a "random
manifestation of hate intended to spread panic and fracture the civil order and contin-
uation of American society").
264. Id.
265. Id. (noting that the attacks of September 11 were "simply the random manifes-
tation of hate intended to spread panic and fracture the civil order and continuation
of American society").
266. HEYMANN, supra note 4, at 154 (noting that the threat of terrorism has existed
for years and will never be entirely abolished).
267. Id. at 1. According to the F.B.I., there were only two international terrorist
incidents on U.S. soil from 1985-95. Id.
268. See supra note 6.
269. Id.
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ber 11. Though Thayer and Bickel recognize that the Court has the
authority to determine what is just, they argue that the legislature
and executive are best equipped to handle crisis situations.27 °
This vision of the legislature as the interpreter of the Constitu-
tion271 has been realized by theorists in the wake of September 11.
Douglas Kmiec, for example, argues that elected officials should
remedy the wrong that was committed against innocent civilians. 72
In his view, the PATRIOT Act is a successful balance between law
enforcement and civil liberties.2 73 According to Kmiec, our distrust
in humanity should not be displaced onto elected officials; we must
allow them to do their job. 74
Yet, many argue that Korematsu demonstrates the weaknesses of
representative democracy.275 Although reparations have been paid
to the Japanese, the decision has never been overruled. 76 Black
and Frankfurter's deference to the other branches of government,
therefore, is still constitutional doctrine. 77
The majority in Korematsu found that Congress and the Execu-
tive acted within constitutional boundaries. 278 But what if the
Court had found to the contrary? Thayer proposes that, even if the
answer to the "clear mistake doctrine" is negative, the political
process will ensure that adverse legislators are voted out of of-
fice.279 But in an emergency situation, there may not be enough
time to wait. Though Korematsu held that a restriction on civil
liberties is constitutional, Thayer's recommendation to leave such
decisions up to the political process is bound to fail in the future.
And the future may be now.
As indicated by the debate surrounding the PATRIOT Act and
Bush's Executive Order,28 ° many constitutional issues will arise as
270. See Pew Research Center: Pew Research Ctr., American Psyche Reeling From
Terror Attack (2001).
271. See supra Part I.A.2.
272. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
273. See Kmiec, supra note 23.
274. Id.
275. Id. See also Toner, supra note 197, at 14 (indicating that Americans do in fact
trust government to respond appropriately to September 11).
276. See supra notes 156-190 and accompanying text.
277. Congress enacted a reparations bill in 1948, partially acknowledging its mis-
take and offering small economic compensation. 50 App. U.S.C.A. §1981 (1948). In
the mid-1980s, the convictions of both Korematsu and Hirabayshi were erased. MUR-
PHY, FLEMING & BARBER, supra note 13, at 100.
278. See supra notes 137-153 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 141. This determination answered affirmatively Thayer's "clear
mistake" test. See supra note 51.
280. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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a result of the September 11 events. One lesson from September
11 is that we cannot wait for something to go wrong. Whether it is
terrorism or the tramping of civil liberties, we must take measures
to prevent its occurrence.
B. Deliberative Democracy Is the Solution
As Cass Sunstein suggests, we must seize the opportunity that
our democracy allows us. 28 1 We must discuss and debate these is-
sues as part of a deliberative democracy.282 As such, legislators
and citizens alike should deliberate about the common good above
and beyond the clashing of personal interests.283
People must face this new situation with the confidence that they
have the ability to make a change. We cannot wait for the court, or
even Congress, to make a decision. Political commentators have
approached September 11 with such confidence.284 The PATRIOT
ACT and the Order are under constant scrutiny, precisely what
Sunstein had in mind.
Moreover, this scrutiny may be why, in the months following
September 11, the barks have been worse than the bites. Even
though Bush and Ashcroft's initial proposals instilled fear in the
minds of thousands, the feared results have not been realized. For
example, despite criticism that the prisoners held at Guantanamo
Bay have not been treated well, Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, maintains that their treatment is appropriate.285 Fur-
thermore, the Eastern District of Virginia commenced a fair trial
process against John Walker Lindh, an American citizen who be-
came a fighter for the Taliban at the age of eighteen.286 Even
281. See supra Part III.A and III.B.
282. SUNSTEIN, supra note 87, at 133.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 135. Attempting to synthesize liberalism and republicanism, Sunstein
suggests that deliberative democracy should limit the role of courts in deciding certain
issues. Rather, such issues should be left to the citizenry: "For this reason it seeks to
ensure that political outcomes benefit from widespread participation by the citi-
zenry." Id.
285. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 241; Etzioni, supra note 200; Safire, supra note 220;
Toner, supra note 197; Toobin, supra note 212; Tribe, supra note 23.
286. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Jackie Calmes & Carla Anne Robbins, Status of Guanta-
namo Bay Detainees Is Focus of Bush Security Team's Meeting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28,
2002, at A16 (noting that Rumsfeld has labeled the detainees' status as "unlawful
combatants" and justified their harsh treatment by stating that that they are "among
the most dangerous, best-trained vicious killers on the face of the earth"). But see
Michael Byers, Ignore the Geneva Convention and Put Our Own Citizens at Risk,
HUMANIST, Mar. 1, 2002, at 33 (advocating that the detainees be treated as prisoners
of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention). Byers' description of the detain-
2002] 1747
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
Zacarias Moussaoui, the first man to be charged in the September
11 attacks, is receiving a trial in civil court.287
Furthermore, in line with Sunstein's theory, people recognize
that the status quo may not be neutral.288 For example, some are
unhappy with the amended FISA requirement which now enables
authorities to obtain warrants so long as a "significant purpose" of
the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.289
This leaves open the possibility that other purposes may affect the
decision of whether to issue a warrant or not. As a result, many
may fear race or ethnicity to factor into the decision. But who de-
termined that the original requirement of "primary purpose" was
just? Perhaps a "significant purpose" is a better requirement. Per-
haps such changes in our civil liberties are not what Sunstein had in
mind when he wrote about a deliberative democracy. In other
words, even though the legislation has altered our rights, this may
be necessary given the current situation. Regardless, it is this type
of debate that Sunstein had in mind when he wrote about a delib-
erative democracy.
In so doing, deliberative democracy will guarantee that certain
commitments to liberty are sustained, while at the same time, al-
lowing the citizenry to arrive at the best conclusion.29 ° Sunstein
recognizes that judicial protection of rights alone will not produce
the best outcome.29 1 All three branches of government, as well as
the citizenry, should play an active role in formulating an effective
response to terrorism.292 By embracing the debate between consti-
tutional and representative democracy,293 the President, Congress
ees' being "chained, manacled, hooded, even sedated, their beards shorn off against
their will. . . " has incited many civil rights groups to protest this treatment. See, e.g.,
Tod Lindberg, About Those Detainees; The Administration's Legal Reasoning is Open
to Question (But Closed to Scrutiny), THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 11, 2002, at 17
(noting the discontent fo the American Civil Liberties Union and Human Watch with
the actions of the Bush Administration).
287. United States v. John Phillip Walker Lindh, 2002 Extra Lexis 265.
288. Michael Isikoff, Should This Man Die? NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 2002, at 30.
289. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
290. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 15 Stat
272.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 134. Political outcomes "are to be produced by an extended process of
deliberation and discussion, in which new information and new perspectives are
brought to bear." Id.
293. Id. at 347; see also Kmiec, supra note 23, at 57 (indicating that Congress and
the President have the authority to combat terrorism); Cole, supra note 10, at 30
(maintaining that "passing the buck to the judges nurtures the undemocratic myth
that courts are the sole custodians of constitutional truth"); Albert R. Hunt, Govern-
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and Court, together with an active citizenry, can redraw the line
between civil liberties and national security.294
CONCLUSION
On September 10, 2001, most Americans did not think twice
before leaving their homes in the morning. They rode the subways,
went to work, ascended to the top floors of their office buildings
and returned home to watch baseball and sitcoms-all without a
second thought. The biggest issues in the news were the disappear-
ance of Washington intern Chandra Levy and Elizabeth Dole's de-
cision to battle Jesse Helms in the race for senator of North
Carolina.
All of that changed on September 11. Americans stopped taking
every aspect of their lives for granted. Parents started giving their
children one extra hug before dropping them off at school. People
now take a few minutes out of their busy lives to call friends and
make plans to catch up on lost time. All the while, American pride
has resurfaced.
Such a sense of patriotism has not existed in this country for de-
cades.2 95 At the same time, a newfound fear pervades every aspect
of life. Americans are more understanding of terrorist activities in
other areas of the world because now, they too, are visible targets
of hate.296
As our government tries to maintain a balance between civil lib-
erties and national security, citizens must maintain an active voice.
In the word of Justice Learned Hand, "Liberty lives in the hearts
and minds of men and women; when it dies there, no Constitution,
no law, no court can save it."' 297 Learned Hand acknowledged that
our democracy is worth little without an active citizenry. 298
ment to the Rescue, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 2001-02, at 84, 86 (suggesting
that Congress and the media play a larger role than the Court in effecting a response
to terrorism).
294. Supra Part I.
295. Sunstein recognizes that the legislature cannot be relied upon alone because it
does not always represent the will of the people. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 281, at
125. However, political deliberation between the branches is an integral part of the
system of checks and balances which makes our society work. Id. at 135. "It is con-
nected with the American belief that disagreement and heterogeneity are creative
forces, indispensable to a well-functioning republic." Id.
296. Putnam, supra note 197, at 36. Seventy-seven percent favor the use of military
action even if it involves thousands of causalities. Supra note 269.
297. See Ashcroft, supra note 7.
298. Jeffrey Rosen, What Price Security: Testing the Resilience of American Values,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at 4 (quoting Justice Learned Hand's analysis of Ameri-
can's ability to hold onto their liberties in times of crisis).
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This notion is especially important today. On September 11,
2001, the nation embarked upon a new era, one that neither the
presidency, Congress, nor the Court has ever encountered. 299 As
Lawrence Tribe stated, "With or without a Supreme Court stead-
fastly dedicated to the civil rights and liberties, each of us must
follow an inner compass that points to the Constitution's true
north. '30 0 We cannot rely on any one institution to save this coun-
try from ruin.3 °1 We must all work together to defend our country
and our Constitution.
299. Id.
300. Tribe, supra note 23, at 31.
301. Id.
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